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Chapter 16
Public Pensions in Washington, D.C.
Edwin C. Hustead
When Congress granted the District of Columbia limited "home rule" in
1974, the fledgling District municipal government inherited numerous re-
sponsibilities that usually fall within the ambit of state or city government.!
To cite but a few examples, the District government found itself both man-
aging and financing a prison system, a land-grant university, a complete trial
and appellate court system, and a Medicaid program. Although these func-
tions were expensive - and experience would demonstrate that they would
become far more costly than anyone foresaw in 1974-they could be justi-
fied as normal attributes of a government vested with home rule powers.
Equally important, their costs were defrayed (at least in part) by a "federal
payment" -an annual lump sum grant that the U.S. federal government
made to the District as part of its annual appropriations process.
This was not the case with District pension liabilities. In addition to build-
ings and programs, the District inherited employees and retirees, and they
came with built-in retirement costs. Congress first began to pass legislation
granting pensions to District employees in the last quarter of the nineteenth
century, well before the establishment of the Civil Service Retirement Sys-
tem in 1920 for civilian employees of the federal government, and the sys-
tem expanded over time. By 1974, District employees participated in three
major District-only retirement programs:
Police and firefighters. This program was established in 1916, replacing sev-
eral earlier programs that covered municipal police, as well as members
of the secret service and other uniformed federal police forces operating
within the District. By 1974, this was the largest retirement program lim-
ited to District employees, providing pension and disability benefits to over
13,000 active and retired police and firefighters, as well as limited numbers
of secret service personnel. The program had achieved notoriety for its gen-
erous treatment of disability pension applications: as of 1969, over 98 per-
cent of the retirees had "gone out on disability."
Public PensIons in WashIngton, D.C. 355
Teachers. Established in 1920, the program covered about 12,000 active
and retired teachers in the municipal elementary and secondary schools.
Judges. The newest and numerically smallest of the systems, the judges'
program was created in 1974, when Congress established a new system of
local trial and appellate courts.
The majority ofthe remaining District employees (clerks, sanitation work-
ers, etc.) participated in the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS), the
umbrella retirement program for federal employees, which is described in
detail in Hustead and Hustead in this volume.
While the three District systems had different benefit levels, eligibility
requirements and administrative structures, they shared several important
characteristics with CSRS.They are all defined benefit plans that allow work-
ers to retire earlier than their private sector counterparts, and often provide
subsidies for early retirements. Police and firefighters can retire at any age
with 20 years' service; teachers at age 50 with 25 years' service; andjudges at
age 60 with 10 years' service. The District's cost-of-living allowance (COLA)
scheme was more generous than even the CSRS. Retired District police and
firefighters received COLAs that matched any salary increase paid to active
employees, and teachers were entitled to twice-a-year COLAs. (Judges had
to manage on a once-a-year COLA).
The District of Columbia 1979 Retirement Reform Act
It would have been relatively simple to draft legislative language in 1974
transferring administrative responsibilities for the retirement programs
from the federal government to the District. The deficiencies inherent in the
pre-1974 retirement systems were sufficiently apparent, however, that Con-
gress delayed the transfer while efforts were made to craft remediallegisla-
tion addressing the most glaring problems. It ultimately proved impossible
to pass effective legislation that satisfied the necessary stakeholders, and the
resulting "District of Columbia Retirement Reform Act of 1979" (PL 96-
122) had the dubious distinction of making a bad situation worse.
The process began with the assumption that the retirement programs
would be transferred en bloc to the District. It was also eventually decided
that the District would not be allowed to make any significant changes to
the existing plan rules regarding defined benefit levels, retirement ages and
accrual patterns. Thus the District would be responsible for the benefits of
workers who retired before home rule, the benefits earned by current em-
ployees after the passage of home rule, and the cost of any future accruals.
The only open issue was the extent to which the federal government would
contribute to assist the District in discharging these retirement costs. The
answer was, not much.
Inherited liabilities. Congress retained Arthur Andersen & Co. to calculate
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the unfunded liabilities ofthe District programs as ofl974, and the accoun-
tants duly reported that the figure was $2 billion. In 1978, Congress passed
legislation that would have provided the District with a series of $65 mil-
lion payments for twenty-five years, a formula that was reckoned to cover
the benefit costs of workers who had retired before home rule (and left
the costs of subsequent retirees up to the District). However, the Carter
administration vetoed the measure on the grounds that it was excessively
generous. By 1979, when the unfunded liabilities had grown to $2.7 billion,
Congress and the administration agreed on a single $38 million payment
coupled with twenty-five annual payments of $52 million. The payments
had a present value of $687 million, which was supposed to cover 80 per-
cent of the retirement benefits (and 33 percent of disability benefits) of pre-
home rule retirees. The cost of post-1974 retirees would fall entirely upon
the District.
Prospective contributions from the district. The most striking feature of the
1979 Reform Act was the statutory formula that set the District's posttransfer
annual contribution to the programs. As long as the federal payment was in
effect, the formula directed the District to pay the lesser of (1) the programs'
"pay as you go" costs and (2) the programs' normal cost plus projected inter-
est. What this meant, of course, was that the original $2 billion in under-
funding would steadily grow. Mter 2004 (when the federal payment was to
cease) the District's payment would rise to the sum of the programs' normal
cost plus interest on the programs' unfunded liability.
Benefit structure. Even tentative suggestions that the DC plans' generous
benefit structure warranted modification triggered objections from unions
and employee groups, all of whom had excellent relations with the rele-
vant congressional committees. As a result, only minor changes were made
to the old benefit system, and even those changes were made prospective,
thereby "grandfathering" most of the workforce. Teachers who retired after
1980 would receive "only" one annual COLA rather than two, and police
and firefighters hired after 1980 had the salary-related COLA replaced with
a twice-a-year consumer price index (CPI)-based formula. No changes were
made to the judges' benefits.
Plan administration. The Reform Act created a nine-member District of
Columbia Retirement Board composed of mayoral appointees and repre-
sentatives from the participant groups. Contrary to what one might expect
from the nomenclature, the new board did not administer the programs.
Instead, tasks such as record keeping, benefit administration, and benefit
payments, were all performed by the Office ofPay and Retirement within the
Office of the Mayor. The board was charged with investing assets, or more
accurately, selecting competing private sector asset managers to invest the
assets.
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TABLE 1. District of Columbia's Public Pension Plan Costs: 1979-1995 ($ million)
Excess
Actu- ofall
arially contri-
Partici- Total deter- butions Pension
Fiscal year District's pants' contri- mined over plan
ending contri- contri- butions normal normal unfunded
September 30 butions butions to plansa cost costs liability
1980 $107.6 $21.1 $128.7 $84.6 $44.1 $N/Ab
1981 107.7 20.2 127.9 81.1 46.8 N/Ab
1982 135.8 60.9 196.7 85.5 111.2 2,679.7
1983 142.9 22.6 165.5 94.6 70.9 2,677.7
1984 174.1 24.4 198.5 108.4 90.1 3,090.2
1985 165.1 24.6 189.7 113.9 75.8 3,190.7
1986 176.5 26.4 202.9 113.7 89.2 N/A
1987 173.4 28.5 201.9 122.1 79.8 4,213.4
1988 180.3 30.7 211.0 137.3 73.7 4,440.0
1989 194.3 34.8 229.1 121.6 107.5 4,447.0
1990 222.6 34.7 257.3 135.8 121.5 4,941.0
1991 225.3 37.3 262.6 151.0 111.6 4,505.2
1992 255.0 35.2 290.2 148.1 142.1 4,558.6
1993 292.3 36.0 328.3 140.6 187.7 4,418.2
1994 308.1 39.6 347.7 146.4 201.1 4,729.7
1995 297.8 37.7 335.5 136.1 199.4
Totals $3,158.8 $514.7 $3,673.5 $1,921.0 $1,752.5
Source: Appleseed Foundation, 1996.
a'The $52 million federal contributions required under the Retirement Reform Act of 1979,
P.L. 96-122, were rwt included in these data because they did not impact the actuarially deter-
mined normal cost.
b·These unfunded prior service costs were not readily available.
The Appleseed Foundation Report
and Counterreformation
Following passage of the 1979 Reform Act, the DC pension programs de-
veloped as one could have anticipated, given the parameters established
by Congress. Between 1980 and 1995, the District's required contributions
nearly tripled, and the programs' inherited liabilities increased. The dismal
picture is illustrated in Table 1.
The spiraling rise in annual pension costs took place against a backdrop
of general financial difficulty for the District. In a nutshell, the post-home
nile District faced a combination of a declining population, a shrinking tax
base, and expanding costs for education, welfare, the prison system, and
myriad other functions. During the administration of Mayor Kelly (1990-
94), the District suspended payments to the pension programs. The D.C.
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Retirement Board responded with a lawsuit that resulted in the issuance of
an injunction requiring the city to make its annual payments within the time
prescribed by the Reform Act.
These developments triggered an unusual response from the private sec-
tor. In 1995, a local nonprofit public interest organization composed oflaw-
yers and other professionals operating under the intriguing sobriquet of the
"DC Appleseed Center for Law and Justice" took up the study and analysis
of the District Retirement Programs. The lawyers and pension professionals
funded by the Center issued a report and policy recommendations in June
1996 (Appleseed Foundation 1996).
This Appleseed Report began by affirming that the District government
had no responsibility for the massive underfunding of the programs. It
showed that the federal government had created the benefit structure and
had elected to maintain the Programs on an unfunded basis prior to down-
loading to the District in 1979. Since that time, the District's contributions
(coupled with those ofthe employees) more than covered the normal costs
associated with post-1979 accruals. The report further established that the
investment practices of the Retirement Board were prudent and played no
part in the underfunding of the programs. Finally, the Appleseed Report
warned that an already-dismal situation would get even worse when the fed-
eral payments ceased in 2004. The trigger mechanism built into the 1979
Act would then require an annual contribution equal to normal cost plus
interest on the programs' unfunded liability (which at that time would equal
$7 billion) or $490 million. As the report dryly noted, by that time the Dis-
trict's pension costs would exceed its payroll. Moreover, this heroic expen-
diture would not reduce the principal of the inherited unfunded liabilities:
that would require an additional $300+ million a year.
Once it had established that the existing system was doomed, the Apple-
seed report recommended several proposed changes. It argued that the sim-
plest and fairest method of dealing with the District pension problem was
for the federal government to reclaim the District's pension plans. Under
this scenario, the federal government would accept financial responsibility
for all of the pension programs' benefit costs associated with retirees, active
employees and former employees with benefits vested as of the transfer date.
The federal government would also receive all the assets held by the pension
programs.
The District would then be free to establish new benefit plans covering
new hires. The District would have full control over selecting the structure
and benefit levels of the new plans-the report went so far as to suggest that
the District adopt a defined contribution structure-and the District would
be solely responsible for funding them. The District would also provide the
federal system with an annual payment equal to the normal cost of the post-
transfer benefit accruals earned by the transferred participants.
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All too often, public policy analyses and recommendations lie unread,
but the Appleseed Report proved to be an exception to the rule. During
the summer and fall of 1996, the Foundation's board and staff conducted
a remarkably effective education campaign before the Congress, the D.C.
Council, and the Clinton administration's Office of Management and Bud-
get. The foundation also obtained solid support from the local news media,
as stories and editorials in the Washington Post began to stress the urgent need
for solutions to the District's pension problem.
In the last week of 1996, President Clinton approved the basic elements
of a legislative proposal to address the fiscal and management woes of the
District. The first element of the package contained a modified version of
the approach to the pension problem presented in the Appleseed Report.
Other aspects of the proposal called for a federal takeover of the District's
prison, court and criminal justice system, the federalization of the District's
tax system, and other elements too numerous to mention here.
In February 1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) sum-
moned representatives from numerous Federal agencies and departments
to a meeting in the Treaty Room of the Old Executive Building, to outline
the proposal and assign drafting responsibilities. Responsibility for drafting
the pension proposal was entrusted to staffof the National Economic Coun-
cil, the Treasury, OMB, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corporation (PBGC). Drafters were told to take all the time they
needed, so long as the legislative language and proposed descriptive ma-
terial was finished within three weeks. While most aspects of the bill (prisons,
taxes, courts, etc.) ended up requiring several months to draft, the pension
team actually completed a passable draft before the three week deadline.
The District of Columbia Retirement
Protection Act of 1997
The resulting bill outlining the Administration's proposal to assume the Dis-
trict's unfunded pension liability was introduced as part of the "National
Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997." A
version of the Administration's proposal passed Congress relatively quickly,
and "the District of Columbia Retirement Protection Act of 1997" became
effective in October ofl997. (It appeared in Title XI, Subtitle A, of the Bal-
anced Budget Act of 1997, PL 105-32).
In drafting this pension law, the Administration faced two major con-
straints. The first was that the federal government's assumption of the Dis-
trict's unfunded pension liability could not impact on the recent agreement
to balance the budget by the year 2002. For that reason, the federal govern-
ment could incur no costs before fiscal year 2003. The second constraint was
the lack of any department or agency within the federal government with
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experience or knowledge in administering a public pension plan remotely
similar to traditional state and local government pension plans.
Following roughly the model set out in the Appleseed Report, the Act
divided the $3.9 billion in pension program assets between the federal gov-
ernment and the District. The Act specified that the District would keep $1.3
billion, which would be used to help fund the replacement programs that
the District would establish. The remaining $2.6 billion would migrate to
a new Federal Trust Fund with no restrictions on the investments. Permit-
ting investments to continue in the private sector avoided converting the
assets to an internal fund. Conversion to federal funds would have reduced
the deficit in the year of the conversion but, by drawing on federal funds
within the budget for benefits, would have increased the deficit in each suc-
ceeding year. This provision satisfied the first constraint mentioned above-
assets in the trust fund would be sufficient to ensure that no new net costs re-
sulted in any year prior to 2003. The new fund would be sufficient to pay all
federal obligations assumed in the Act until well after the year 2002. A sec-
ond federal fund invested entirely in federal securities was also established
to pay benefits after the assets of the federal trust fund were depleted. The
act provides that the new fund will receive annual federal payments (drawn
from annual appropriations) in an amount determined by accepted actu-
arial methods to amortize the original unfunded liability.
The act transferred all liabilities and administrative responsibilities for
the smaller judges' plan to the federal government. With respect to the
Teachers Plan and the Police and Fire Plan, the act transferred responsibility
for paying the retirement benefits of plan participants who retired before
June 30, 1997, to the federal government. The responsibility for paying pen-
sion benefits to new District employees remained with the District, in the
form of whatever replacement plans the District decided to adopt.
Diverging from the Appleseed proposal, the act split both financial and
administrative responsibility for current District employees between the
Federal government and the District. In rough terms, benefit accruals for
the federal portion of the employees' benefits were frozen onJune 30, 1997,
with the federal government responsible for the prefreeze portion. While
the federal government will not be responsible for benefits earned by cur-
rent employees in future service years (other than judges), their federal
benefit will reflect pay increases on the frozen benefit. Frozen benefits will
also continue to be subject to cost of living adjustments. All future disabled
retirees' benefits were the responsibility of the District. The act also pledged
the full faith and credit of the United States to meet its responsibilities to
pay benefits for the Police and Teachers Programs.2
Any benefit subsequent to the freeze for current workers would be deter-
mined by the terms of the District's replacement plans. The drafters had no
way of knowing what type of replacement plan the District might choose,
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and they sought to draft provisions that would not limit the District's choices
for a replacement plan. As in the past, however, political realities overcame
actuarial theory, and the District Council dutifully enacted a replacement
plan for Teachers and for Police and Fire that was substantially the same as
the existing plans. Curiously, this did not have an adverse effect on the Dis-
trict's cash flow because the $1.3 billion left behind by the act covered plan
costs for the foreseeable future. The District plans have also been placed on
a sound actuarial basis to avoid future financing shortfalls.
The act placed responsibility for administration of the trust fund and
benefits with the Department of Treasury. (It is a matter of record that no
other federal agencies were eager to accept this job.) To deal with the lack
of experience at Treasury in administering public pension plans, the act al-
lowed the secretary to delegate much of the responsibility to third-party
trustees. The secretary was also given broad regulatory powers under the act.
The trustee or trustees were empowered to invest funds, manage the existing
plans, and make payments on behalf of participants and beneficiaries. The
act called for cooperation and an exchange of information between the Dis-
trict, the District's Retirement Board, and the Treasury Department. These
parties have entered into Memorandums of Understanding to coordinate
both the transfer of assets to the federal trust fund, and benefit administra-
tion.
The Omnibus Consolidated Act of 1998:
Pension Protection Protected
By this point, it may be evident that governmental pension reform has
proven to be a never-ending process, and this conclusion was reiterated
with the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1998 (OCAA 1998).
Among other things, section 801 of the law permitted the secretary to allow
the pension trustee contractor to hire subcontractors. One should not infer
that this was a gesture ofconfidence in favor ofcontracting, because another
change in the same section clarified that the secretary could have work per-
formed by Treasury employees instead of contractors. The act also allowed
the secretary new authority in determining exactly which assets should be left
behind with the District, a point that had apparently caused controversy.
October of 1998 saw the passage, twice, of a myriad of corrections to the
judges 1997 legislation. The District of Columbia Courts and Justice Tech-
nical Corrections Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-274), managed to secure full
faith and credit for the judges' pensions, along with several other changes
stretching the meaning of "technical corrections." Apparently concerned
that simply getting these corrections passed once was not enough, hours
later the exact same set of provisions was enacted into law as section 804 of
OCAA98.
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Section 130 of the 1998 amendments merits careful attention. The 1997
legislation had given the Secretary broad authority to invest the old DC pen-
sion program assets including permitting investment in private securities.
The ability to continue to hold and invest the pension program assets out-
side the federal budget was necessary to avoid increasing the Federal deficit.
The 1998 amendments eliminated investment discretion altogether in favor
of "public debt securities" of the United States. By 1998, annual projected
surpluses were large and there was no deficit to increase. Instead, the then
current need was for spending increases to allow Congress to pass unrelated
legislation with offsetting costs. In other words, the arcane rules of deficit
reduction, applied in times of surplus, had led the D. C. pension retirement
financing back to investment in federal debt issues.
Conclusion
We have at last, therefore, come full circle. Today, a portion of the pensions
of D.C. employees accrued before 1997 are again backed by the federal gov-
ernment's own securities and promise to pay. Employees with pension ac-
cruals after 1997 are the responsibility of the District. Continued federal
government intervention in the District of Columbia's pension system is a
near certainty, judging from events over the last thirty years.
Notes
1. The District of Columbia is the capital of the United States, and as such the
District is treated differently from states or municipalities in many ways. The legal
structure outlining how the nation's capital is governed is spelled out in The District
of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act, P.L. 93-198.
2. The legislative provisions dealing with the judges (drafted by the judges them-
selves) neglected to obtain a similar commitment.
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